Americas Quarterly

in Brazil. The congressional agenda is full of tough law-and-order measures, such as reducing the age at which adolescents can be charged as adults, and state governments are demanding federal intervention. Here it is important to stress one major point: policy responses offered up by elected officials in response to the popular temperature at the moment rarely last. Opinions on a specific policy measure are unstable. Instead, rank ordering solutions has shown to be much more stable and reflective of public opinion. In other words, the fundamental question is not if people are for or against a measure but, among all possible policy options, which ones they believe will be most effective.

The State as a
Crime-Fighter

Brazilians, along with their neighbors in the hemisphere, generally believe that the state should be the primary agent of change. Latin American public opinion, in general, supports government intervention at the expense of civil rights and existing institutional arrangements. Two important examples in Brazil come to mind: ( 1) the decision to use the armed forces to combat urban crime and ( 2) reducing the age at which adolescents can be tried as adults from 18 to 16. Both issues have had super-majorities (from 75 to 80 percent in favor) for more than half a decade. However, only now are both issues being seriously considered by political actors.

_g^t_o^h_no^e_edwBOGOTÁ: CRIME-FIGHTING MAYORS by Tábata Peregrín _s

Now that the benefits of three successful terms dedicated to reducing Bogotá’s crime rates are being felt, the pressure is on the current mayor.

Bogotá, once wracked with crime, has become a safer city. According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the number of murders has dropped from 80 for every 100,000 residents in the beginning of the 1990s to 17 deaths today, and crime generally has dropped 40 percent between 1993 and 2007.

Many analysts say Bogotá’s municipal government deserves the credit. Notably, two Bogotá mayors from opposing political parties presided over the decline— Antanas Mockus (1995-1997, 2001-2003) and Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000)—but neither claims single-handed success. Rather, according to Hugo Frühling, a security expert at the University of Chile, the fact that both pursued consistent policies demonstrated “a unique case

Garzón: Will the legacy continue?

of policy continuity between governments, something not very common in Latin America.”

Mockus, a mathematician, is quick to recognize the contribution of his municipal rival. He notes that Peñalosa, whose three-year tenure was sandwiched between Mockus’ two terms, maintained the crime-fighting initiatives he had begun. The results speak for themselves. For example, a four-year policy of clos-

ing bars and nightclubs at one o’clock in the morning— called La Hora Zanahoria (roughly translated, “the nerd hour”)—helped reduce homicides by eight percent. Another program that replaced traffic guards with mimes helped to reduce accident-related deaths by 60 percent. For his part, Peñalosa instituted a series of changes in transportation and other urban reforms that boosted security and strengthened the legal system.

Over the eight-year period both mayors were in office, arrests rose 400 percent. Now that the benefits of three successful terms dedicated to reducing Bogotá’s once-in-famous crime rates are being felt, the pressure is on subsequent mayors, like Luis Eduardo Garzón (2003-2007), to stay the course.