the
environment
percent) and industrial development ( 14 percent). By
reducing the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb carbon, deforestation indirectly affects carbon and has
represented an important addition to the agenda.
Considered by itself, the Poznan Conference
made little progress. This was largely due to the
nature of international negotiations. The four topics under discussion tended to pit developed and
developing countries against one another. Developing countries were more interested in financing
and technology transfer, while developed countries focused on what they could get in mitigation
in exchange for financing and technology transfer.
And neither side was willing to concede until seeing
what the other was willing to offer.
The importance of Poznan was that it was done
almost simultaneously with the final European
negotiations that led to what is called the “Three
20s.” European countries agreed that by 2020 Europe
will improve its energy efficiency by 20 percent; that
20 percent of its energy will come from nonconventional renewable sources; and that they would reduce
emissions by 20 percent from 1990 levels. Moreover,
if another “significant country” agrees to reduce its
emissions by 30 percent, Europe will match it.
To achieve these levels, the European governments agreed that their main polluting industries
would have 21 years to achieve zero emissions.
The Approach to Success
in Copenhagen
The negotiation of the European Three 20s signals
that the developed world can reach clear and concrete agreements on emission reduction. But more
important, the nature of the limits and the transparency required to reach them indicates that to
achieve full global agreement in Copenhagen, developed countries must agree to provide carbon content
information on all products entering their markets.
In other words, products would be listed by their
carbon footprint (the amount of carbon a country or
product produces), and countries would impose taxes
or restrictions based on ceilings. The bill presented in
the U. S. Congress this past summer proposes just that.
In the bill, the U.S. promises to reduce its emissions
by 17 percent from 2005 levels. To put this in context,
42 Americas Quarterly FALL 2009
I PROPOSE A GLOBAL
REGULATORY AND E O D
Japan has already offered to reduce its emissions by
nine percent in 2020 from its 1990 levels.
There is reason for optimism that an agreement
can be reached at Copenhagen. Some of that optimism is based on what appears to be a growing rapprochement between the U. S. and China over climate
change. Chinese Environmental Protection Minister
Zhou Shengxian has already made t wo visits to Washington, and there has been at least one reciprocal visit
from U.S. Climate Change negotiator Todd Stern.
Some observers now refer to the “G2” (U.S. and
China), rather than the G20, as the key players in climate negotiations. If the “G2” reach a certain level
of consensus, much of the hard nut of the negotiations will be cracked: China, which emits close to 21
percent of current global greenhouse gases, is now
the world’s largest emitter—narrowly edging past
the U.S., which emits 20 percent. Together, the two
countries represent a hefty 40 percent of GHG emissions of the planet.
Despite the apparent divisions between Annex 1
and non-Annex 1 countries, the best way forward is to
look for a kind of “voluntary” obligation from developing countries to reduce emissions, that is, something that would not necessarily commit them but
would provide a menu of options to meet that goal.
Here are Some Goals and
Proposals That Could Be Put
on the Table for Discussion
Establish the framework for energy efficient
growth. This could be done by setting a standard
that for each percentage point of GDP growth, energy
demand must decrease less than the expected rate
of growth.
