FRESH LOOK
Despite these links, U. S. policy pri-
orities (namely the war on drugs, the
isolation of Cuba and free-trade agree-
ments) are increasingly distant from
regional priorities, and sometimes
in conflict with them. Many in the
region agree wih the description of
The collapse of the U. S. financial sys-
tem in 2008 and the global recession
further undermined the prestige of
market-based growth models in the
eyes of many Latin Americans.
cial services to the poor reflects the
weak state of government institutions. Leaders like Chávez may have
expanded the role of the government,
but they have not made government
institutions more effective or less
corrupt. Naturally, this raises doubts
about the sustainability of current
social policies, Weitzman observes.
Andean regimes? Morales, Chávez and
Correa have changed the rules of the
political and economic game in their
countries. Can the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela survive Chávez?
Can Ecuador’s new political and economic order persist after Correa?
Weitzman is careful to point out
that the radical Left’s success in the
Andes is due to more than just charismatic leadership. The governments of
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador have
reduced poverty and expanded the
reach of government services to previously excluded segments of society.
This includes delivering health care,
food, education, or subsidies to their
political bases. However, recent improvements rest on two weak pillars.
First, public institutions remain
weak and often corrupt. Hugo Chávez’
policy of using the national energy
company, Petróleos de Venezuela,
S.A (PDVSA), to fund and deliver so-
Second, the Andean countries are
all enjoying a commodity bonanza,
thanks to high export prices and to
policies that shift a greater share of
commodity revenues into the public
sector, through either high taxation or
nationalization. As Weitzman writes,
“The resource nationalism of Chávez,
Morales and Correa sought to use oil
and gas to pay for the massive redistri-
bution of wealth; but in doing so, they
made it likely that the money would
run out soon and tied their economies
more closely to the notoriously vola-
tile international commodity markets.
Their natural resources were their sal-
vation and their likely damnation.”
Weitzman injects some skepticism
by reminding the reader that “Neither
nationalization nor shock therapy
solved the essential Latin American
problems of inequality, poverty, weak
political institutions and corruption,
so when one failed to work, the pen-
dulum had a habit of swinging back
in the opposite direction.”
The new order may be more du-
rable in Bolivia, where the shift in
political power to the Indigenous
population appears to be structural
and permanent.
What is the longevity of the new
Beyond economics, Weitzman calls
into question the effectiveness of the
“war on drugs.” He provides a valuable
account of how locals view the policy
and its consequences for the region,
including on its politics. The rise of
Evo Morales, once a leader of Boliv-
ia’s cocaleros, is inextricably bound
with Washington’s efforts to eradi-
cate a crop that Indigenous people
historicaly grow for customary use.
Latin Lessons outlines the many factors that have led to the growing political distance between the U. S. and
Latin America—even as economic
and social links have deepened. As
Weitzman documents, Latin America
accounts for a growing share of U.S.
exports ( 24 percent in 2010, compared
with only 14 percent in 1990). The U. S.
bought 42 percent of Latin America’s
exports in 2010, and the region sells
more oil to the U.S. than either Canada or the Middle East. At the same
time, more Latin American immigrants live in the U. S. than ever before.
154 Americas Quarterly SPRING 2012
PHOTOGRAPHS BY LARS KLOVE
