results and, in the worst cases, constrain the ability to identify abuses
of democracy by individual leaders.
The way in which electoral missions are scheduled also needs to be
changed. Election observation missions must be dispatched as early as
possible in the process, preferably at
least two months before election day.
In cases where political polarization
threatens the integrity of the electoral process or the democratic order—and before an observer team is
appointed—the main stakeholders
should be invited to a meeting with
the OAS Permanent Council to agree
on the electoral conditions and rules
that will guide the electoral process.
Along these lines, the procedures
for presenting and discussing the mis-
sion’s report should be broadened. It
is not sufficient for the secretary gen-
eral to be informed of a serious elec-
toral situation in a country, requiring
the presence of an observer mission;
member states must be briefed as well.
Doing so would help give meaning to
the process outlined in Article 20 of
the OAS’s Inter-American Democratic
Charter that allows the secretary gen-
eral to bring to the OAS Permanent
Council’s attention any situation
which, in his opinion, constitutes “an
unconstitutional alteration that seri-
ously impairs the democratic order in
a member state.”
This could work as an exercise in
early warning for an emerging polit-
ical or electoral crisis; the Permanent
Council could then decide on a col-
lective response to avert or correct a
flawed electoral process (e.g., Nica-
ragua) or prevent a breakdown of de-
mocracy (e.g., Honduras).
In such situations, the secretary
general should be empowered by the
OAS Permanent Council to send a
broader mission to observe and mediate in particularly high-risk environments. The missions would report to
the Council and help serve as a trigger for a collective response, if necessary. Such a mission would meet
with stakeholders and help resolve
a political crisis that might threaten
the democratic order or the election’s
integrity even before the electoral
process begins.
In cases where an election mission is prevented from carrying out
its functions, or if electoral authorities blatantly violate the agreement
on procedures for observation, or fail
to accept the missions’ suggestions,
there should be a provision that allows for follow-up should the mission
withdraw or cancel. Such a precedent
was established in the OAS mission to
Peru in 2000, but the regulations and
protocol for doing so (and the follow-up) should be more clearly defined.
The OAS also needs to resist the
temptation to observe any or every
election. Not all elections require ob-
servation. Automatic acceptance of
invitations vitiates the relevance of
electoral observation missions, and
the secretary general should be pre-
pared to refuse a request by the gov-
ernment that arrives too late or is
made in the context of an electoral
process that is already manifestly
biased, or marred by constitutional
violations and objections from the
opposition.
Improvements in the methods and
delivery of technical assistance are
needed as well. Standardizing formats for all final reports and improving the capacity of missions to follow
through on recommendations would
help ensure these reports are better
used by the OAS and other actors and
strengthen national electoral bodies.
Finally, the relevance and prestige
of the mission matter. To this end, the
OAS secretary general—as occurred
in Nicaragua in 1990—should be in
country two days before a presidential election.
These improvements will help to
update and adapt election observation procedures for a new and
changing democratic, political and
diplomatic environment in the hemisphere. Their implementation, however, poses a challenge. In many
respects it is an OAS challenge. When
the effectiveness, impartiality and
importance of election observation
missions are questioned, the role and
relevance of the OAS itself is in doubt.
But revitalizing the OAS’s role in
monitoring elections requires the political courage and leadership of the
secretary general and of countries
strongly committed to election observation, including Canada, Costa Rica,
Chile, Mexico, and the United States.
Their leadership is indispensable to
generating the consensus necessary
to achieve these reforms.
1. FOR MORE INFORMATION SEE:
WWW.OAS.ORG/ES/SAP/DECO/
THE OAS NEEDS TO
RESIST THE TEMPTATION
TO OBSERVE ANY OR
EVERY ELECTION.
Rubén M. Perina teaches at George
Washington and Georgetown
Universities and, as a former
OAS official, directed election
observation missions in Paraguay,
Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela,
and the Dominican Republic.
24
Americas Quarterly SPRING 2012
AMERICASQUARTERLY.ORG
