Americas Quarterly - Winter 2012

son to remove those who are doing
their job well.”
In contrast, Ortega’s reach into the
judicial branch will continue. The
Sandinistas still have a majority in
the Supreme Court. His cabinet will
look the same as it has in the past,
with positions filled by Sandinista
sympathizers loyal to Ortega’s polar-
izing leftist proposals.

The campaigns of Pérez Molina and Ortega laid out ambitious plans for improving their respective countries. But now comes the hard part for both leaders.

Nicaragua’s health and education ministries, key to Ortega’s subsidy-filled agenda, will receive the largest slice of the fiscal pie under the 2012 budget, which is nearly 15 percent higher than last year and includes plans to modernize hospitals and build 1,300 new homes for the country’s marginalized poor.

Promoting Social
Programs

More than half of Guatemala’s population live in poverty. One out of every five children suffers from malnutrition and two-thirds of Guatemala’s land is in the hands of just 2 percent of the population. But Pérez Molina’s government will ignore land reform—the controversial issue that ignited the war—and proposals for the 2012 minimum wage will not cover the cost of the minimum monthly food basket for the nation’s poorest families.

Elections always bring hope of change. But in a region where optimism has frequently been curdled by reality, the differences in temperament, background and philosophies of the new leaders of Guatemala and Nicaragua will prove less determinative than the harsh challenges of the deeply entrenched problems they face—and the weak states they inherited.

Ortega will be under the micro-
scope during the next five years and
will look to expand his programs to
include scholarships, housing, food
rations, and medicine funded by Al-
banisa, before oil money from Chávez
dries up.

,Pérez Molina’s popularity will depend on his ability to tackle crime, and his legacy will be measured by his response to wartime human rights abuses. He will need to tread delicately in congress if he doesn’t want to further isolate an agitated left looking to obstruct PP proposals in an effort to crush the party’s reputation. His 2012 budget falls short of what he needs to jumpstart his agenda and—with no motivation for reelection—his agendas for change could easily fall short.

BFFs: Hugo Chávez and Daniel Ortega embrace in Managua.

Pérez Molina will continue these
initiatives under his new ministry
of social development, although he
could change how the programs are
administered. Pregnant mothers
will receive priority under his plan
and will be given basic food rations
of rice, beans, corn, and cooking oil
until their children turn two years
old—the most crucial years of de-
velopment.

Colom’s government laid the groundwork for Guatemala’s welfare programs. During his presidency, he and his ex-wife, Sandra Torres, launched the Bolsa Solidaria ( Solidarity Budget)—a monthly food ration for the neediest families—and Mi Fa-milia Progresa (My Family Progresses), a conditional cash transfer program to mothers to buy school supplies for their children and pay tuition.

He also will focus on pulling underemployed and informal workers, who make up 60 percent of Guatemala’s population, into the formal sector with plans to boost tourism and attract renewable energy companies. But increased training and education for the nation’s low-skilled, self-employed workforce is unlikely to bear fruit in his four-year mandate.

Ortega will be judged on his ability to continue delivering social handouts. Any changes in the financial pipeline from his Venezuelan benefactors will threaten Ortega’s ability to realize his social agenda. Ultimately, sustainable, long-term progress will depend on creating an institutional framework—including an independent, nonpoliticized judicial system—that can effectively reach the neediest beyond his political clients and beyond the largesse of President Chávez.

In Nicaragua, funds from Venezuela finance social programs that combat hunger and improve literacy. While the programs have helped, poverty and unemployment persist. Around 7 percent of Nicaragua’s 5. 8 million citizens are jobless and nearly 70 percent of the population works in the poorly paying informal sector. The number of poor has dropped since Ortega took office in 2006, but 45 percent remain impoverished, 15 percent survive on one dollar per day and nearly 20 percent are illiterate.

JORGE S. CABRERA A./LATINCONTENT/GETTY

Mike McDonald is a stringer for Reuters and has covered general news in Central America for three years, including presidential elections in Costa Rica, Guatemala and the coup in Honduras.